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Out with the Old and In with the New: An
Analysis of Illinois Maintenance Law under
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and a
Proposal for Its Replacement
"The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."'
INTRODUCTION

Perhaps few issues in family law, or in legal jurisprudence generally,
are debated as widely and heatedly as maintenance is. 2 Opinions on the
subject cover the full range of the spectrum, from the suggestion that
maintenance should be limited,3 to the suggestion that it should be
expanded.4 What does emerge as a unifying theme is the general
dissatisfaction of scholars,5 litigants, practitioners, and judges with the
current maintenance law provisions under the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act ("UMDA"),6 which Illinois has adopted.7 This comment
argues that this dissatisfaction with the current maintenance provisions
cannot be overcome, and that new provisions are necessary to fairly
allocate maintenance awards. The purpose of this comment is to provide a
general overview of some of the major theories scholars are advancing to

1.

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).

2.
Though maintenance is also termed alimony or spousal support, for consistency
purposes this comment uses only the term maintenance.
3. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 482
(1999).
4.
See, e.g., Jane Rutherford & Barbara Tishler, Equalizing the Cost of Divorce
Under the Uniform MarriageandDivorce Act: MaintenanceAwards in Illinois, 23 LOY.U.
CHI. L.J. 459 (1992).
5. See Ira Mark ElIman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. I (1989)
[hereinafter Ellman, Theory]; Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial
Arrangements at Divorce, 87 Ky. L.J. 51 (1998-99); Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4.
6.
Marti E. Thurman, Note, Maintenance: A Recognition of the Need for
Guidelines, 33 UNIv. LOUISVILLE J.FAM. L. 971, 971, 974 (1995); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 308 (amended 1973), 9A Part I U.L.A. 446 (1998).
7. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2000).
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replace existing maintenance law and to synthesize these theories into one
workable solution.
Part I of this comment briefly discusses whether maintenance should
8
simply be abolished, rather than attempts made to reform it. Part II puts
9 Part III discusses
forth Illinois' current maintenance law provisions.
several of the striking problems that Illinois' maintenance law faces. The
first of these problems is income-based disparate impact, according to
which lower-income women are denied the opportunity to receive
maintenance. This problem results primarily from Illinois' inclusion of a
standard of living provision and is a major impediment to fair and just
maintenance awards.' 0 Another notable problem is the one-sided analysis
of contributions-namely, that only sacrifices made by women during a
marriage are examined-which also prevents achievement of fair results."
Lastly, the wide discretion afforded trial courts in applying maintenance
provisions precludes parties to a divorce action from knowing what
2
outcome to expect. This uncertainty frustrates efforts at fair settlements.,
Part IV argues that these problems are insurmountable and that new
maintenance laws are necessary.' 3 In light of the insurmountable nature of
the problems of the current maintenance law, part V examines various
theories scholars have begun espousing regarding whether and how awards
of maintenance can be justified, and how maintenance awards should be5
These theories include: economic incentives;' 7
implemented. 14
morality,'
compensation for marital sacrifices; 6 and equitable notions of
8 debt,' 9 and equality.20 Part VI of this comment attempts to
restitution,'

8. See infra Part I.
See infra Part 1I.
9.
See infra Part II.A. (arguing that the Illinois courts engage in disparate impact
10.
using the standard of living provision as a threshold test for denying maintenance to lowerincome women and through applying the affirmative obligation to work only to lowerincome women).
See infra Part III.B. (examining the lack of consideration given to sacrifices
11.
made by men during a marriage).
See infra Part I.C. (discussing the effects upon settlements of the discretion
12.
given to trial courts in determining whether to award maintenance, and if so, how much to
award).
See infra Part IV.
13.
See infra Part V.A-C.
14.
ElIman, Theory, supra note 5.
15.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
16.
RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 5.03 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft, Part 1,Feb. 14, 1997).

Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral
17.
Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REV. 197.
June R. Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A
18.
Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (1990) [hereinafter Carbone, Reply]; June
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synthesize the aforementioned theories. By doing so, the goal is to devise a
maintenance proposal that considers as many interests as possible in
fashioning new maintenance provisions.2 '
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Maintenance law in the United States derives its historical
underpinnings from English ecclesiastical law. 22
Under English
ecclesiastical law, legal divorce was not allowed. Spouses were allowed
merely to live separate from one another.23 Maintenance was awarded
based on a husband's duty to support his wife after judicial separation. 24
When the United States began applying this English system of maintenance
to absolute divorces, the purpose behind awarding maintenance was no
longer clear because the duty of a husband to support his wife after a legal
divorce was less justifiable. 25 Tension existed between an ex-husband's
continuing duty to support his ex-wife and the full dissolution of the
marriage. 26 Similarly, before the advent of no-fault divorce, the rationale
27
behind maintenance retained some plausibility in its fault-based awards.
Specifically, the rationale was that the award is some form of punishment,
as well as a deterrent, for wrongdoing. After the advent of no-fault bases
for divorce, this rationale disappeared, and a rationale for maintenance
became even less apparent.28 This lack of rationale has led scholars to
formulate various theories both to justify the existence of maintenance
Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43 (2002) [hereinafter Carbone,
ALI].
19.
Parkman, supra note 5.
20.
Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4.
21.
See infra Part VI.
22.
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 420 (1968).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 421.

26.

460.

27.

Id

Ellman, Theory, supra note 5, at 5-9; Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at

28.
Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at 460. Illinois law provides both fault and
no-fault bases for divorce. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401 (2000). However, the courts have
noted that the requirement of fault is "often ignored by the litigants, the attorneys and the
trial judges of this State." In re Marriage of Escatel, 589 N.E.2d 1042, 1044 (I11.App. Ct.
1992) (Hass, J., specially concurring). Moreover, Illinois maintenance provisions state that
fault should not be referenced in determining maintenance. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504
(2000).
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29
awards and to suggest the form maintenance awards should take. None of
these theories are without their flaws, and with this fact in consideration,
this comment seeks to synthesize some of the major theories to ameliorate
potential problems, and present a workable solution.

1.

ASKING THE INITIAL QUESTION

Given the uncertain rationale for maintenance awards, the initial
question necessarily is whether maintenance should be retained or simply
abolished altogether. While this is the natural starting point, few scholars
suggest the abolition of maintenance is appropriate. Generally, even critics
of maintenance advocate for its limitation, not abolition. ° Critics' concerns
3
often center on promotion of a dependency stereotype, ' yet scholars also
acknowledge that women face difficult financial circumstances after
32
As a result, scholars generally focus on developing underlying
divorce.
theories to explain the continuance of the system of maintenance. 33 Given
this paucity of treatment regarding whether maintenance should be
continued in contrast to the abundance of treatment concerning why and
how maintenance should be continued, this comment focuses exclusively
on the latter topic.

Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at 460-65.
29.
But see In re Spencer, 23 P. 395, 398 (Cal. 1890) (Paterson, J., dissenting) ("It
30.
is an anomalous condition of domestic affairs which requires a man who has been permitted
and encouraged to assume new marital duties and obligations, to support a legal relict, who
is not only matrimonially dead to him, but is perhaps married to another, who is unable or
unwilling to support her").
Bartlett, supra note 3, at 482; Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A
31.
Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. I, 80 (1987).
See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
32.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 337-39
(1985). Dr. Weitzman offers the widely-cited statistic that divorced men's standard of living
increases forty-two percent approximately one year after divorce, while divorced women's
standard of living decreases seventy-three percent approximately one year after divorce. Id.
See Carbone, ALl, supra note 18, at 43-55; Ellman, Theory, supra note 5, at 333.
12; Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71
N.C.L. REV. 721, 721-26 (1993); Parkman, supra note 5, at 51-56; Twila L. Perry, Alimony:
Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2481-86
(1994); Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at 459-65; Schneider, supra note 17, at 197-201;
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond A New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227,
2227-35 (1994).
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II.

ILLINOIS' CURRENT MAINTENANCE LAW PROVISIONS

The UMDA was promulgated in 1970, and amended in 1971 and
1973. 34 Eight states have officially adopted the UMDA, including:
Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and
Washington.35 The goal of the UMDA provisions regarding maintenance
and property division is to:
encourage the court to provide for the financial needs of
the spouses by property disposition rather than by an award
of maintenance. Only if the property is insufficient for the
purpose and if the spouse who seeks maintenance is unable
to secure employment appropriate to his skills and interest
or is occupied with child care may an award of
maintenance be ordered.36
Illinois adopted the UMDA in 1977 and has amended it since then.
The current provisions are as follows:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation or declaration of invalidity of marriage, or a
proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the
marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse, the court may grant a temporary or
permanent maintenance award for either spouse in amounts
and for periods of time as the court deems just, without
regard to marital misconduct, in gross or fixed or indefinite
periods of time, and the maintenance may be paid from the
income or property of the other spouse after consideration
of all relevant factors, including:
(1) the income and property of each party, including
marital property apportioned and non-marital property
assigned to the party seeking maintenance;
(2) the needs of each party;
(3) the present and future earning capacity of each party;

34.
UNIF. MARRIAGE
159 (1998).
35.
UNIF. MARRIAGE
tbl. at 159 (1998).
36.
UNIF. MARRIAGE
cmt. at 447 (1998).

AND DIVORCE ACT

(amended 1971, 1973), 9A Part I U.L.A.

AND DIVORCE ACT

(amended 1971, 1973), 9A Part I U.L.A.

AND DIVORCE ACT

§ 308 (amended 1973), 9A Part I U.L.A.
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(4) any impairment of the present and future earning
capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that party
devoting time to domestic duties or having foregone or
delayed education, training, employment, or career
opportunities due to the marriage;
(5) the time necessary to enable the party seeking
maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training, and
employment, and whether that party is able to support
himself or herself through appropriate employment or is
the custodian of a child making it appropriate that the
custodian not seek employment;
(6) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(7) the duration of the marriage;
(8) the age and the physical and emotional condition of
both parties;
(9) the tax consequences of the property division upon the
respective
economic circumstances of the parties;
contributions and services by the party seeking
(10)
maintenance to the education, training, career, or career
potential, or license of the other
spouse;
(11) any valid agreement of the parties; and
(12) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be
just and
equitable ....

Illinois provisions do differ
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a) (2000).
37.
substantively in several ways from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act [hereinafter
UMDA]. The UMDA states as follows:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or
maintenance following a decree of dissolution of the marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may
grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the
spouse seeking maintenance: ( I) lacks sufficient property to provide for
his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition
or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required
to seek employment outside the home. (b) The maintenance order shall
be in amounts and for periods of time the court deems just, without
regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors
including: (1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
including marital property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his
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III. PROBLEMS WITH ILLINOIS' CURRENT MAINTENANCE LAW
PROVISIONS

A.

THE PERPETUATION OF INCOME-BASED DISPARATE IMPACT

Illinois courts' approach to maintenance is resulting in income-based
disparate impact in maintenance awards. The manner in which this
disparate impact is occurring is two-fold. Through judicial fiat, the courts
have created a threshold test for the determination of who is and who is not
eligible to receive maintenance. 38 As a result, a spouse whose standard of
living during the marriage falls below a certain level is routinely denied
any award of maintenance. 39 The courts also generally do not to enforce
any affirmative obligation to work in situations involving upper-income
women. 4° This unequal application further contributes to disparate impact
because any failure to fulfill the affirmative duty to work may result in
denial or revocation of maintenance.41

needs independently, and the extent to which a provision for support of
a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party to seeking maintenance to find appropriate
employment; (3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the age and the physical and
emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; (6) the ability
of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308 (amended 1973), 9A Part I U.L.A. 446 (1998).
Illinois' provisions are broader in scope than the UMDA provisions in several ways. The
UMDA does not refer to "declaration of invalidity of marriage" nor that "the court may
grant a temporary or permanent maintenance award for either spouse in amounts and for
periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, in gross or
fixed or indefinite periods of time, and the maintenance may be paid from the income or
property of the other spouse after consideration of all relevant factors..." as Illinois does.
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(2) (2002). Illinois eliminated the need threshold for an award of
maintenance contained in the UMDA, effective January I, 1993, while adding Sections (2),
(3), (4), (10), (I1), and (12), and added text to (5), which are not included in the UMDA.
Act of June 9, 1992, P.A. 87-881, § 504, 1992 1l. Laws 1019, 1023-24.
38.
See infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text.
39.
See infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text.
40.
See infra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
41.
See infra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
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The Standardof Living Provision

One of the key factors considered by Illinois courts in their
determination of whether to award maintenance as well as how much
maintenance to award is the standard of living the couple enjoyed while
married.42 Despite the courts' heavy reliance on the standard of living
provision, it is not without its flaws, including its justification and its
application.
a.

Problems With Its Justification

As the court notes in In re Marriage of Jones, one of the benchmarks
"for a,determination of maintenance is the reasonable needs of the spouse
seeking maintenance in view of the standard of living established during
This reliance on "the standard of living during the
the marriage . . .
marriage" provision predates the adoption of the UMDA, and has been44
codified by the Illinois Legislature in some similar form since 1827.
Illinois courts have considered the provision since at least 1892.45
However, no analytical treatment has been given to the standard of living
as the decisive factor for measuring need, either before or after the adoption
of the UMDA. No case law before the adoption of the UMDA that relies
on the standard of living as a basis for maintenance discusses why it is
chosen as a basis. 46 The UMDA does not discuss why the standard of
living provision is included.47 The Illinois legislature does not discuss why
it chose to include the standard of living provision when adopting the
UMDA. 4 8

42.
Gemma B. Allen, Survey of Illinois Law: Family Law, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 819,
828 (1995).
543 N.E.2d 119, 134 (Il. App. Ct. 1989).
43.
44. "When a divorce shall be decreed, it shall and may be lawful for the court to
make such order touching the alimony and maintenance of the wife, the care, custody and
support of the children, or nay of them, as from the circumstances of the parties and the
nature of the case shall be fit, reasonable, and just." 1833 REV. STAT. OF ILL., pg. 234, § 6.
45. Harding v. Harding, 32 N.E. 206, 206 (III. 1892).
46. Id.; See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 189 N.E.2d 401, 403 (II1.App. Ct. 1963);
Walters v. Walters, 94 N.E.2d 726, 728 (11.App. Ct. 1950); Bandy v. Bandy, 61 N.E.2d
1925).
App. Ct. 1945); Herrick v. Herrick, 149 N.E. 820, 823 (I11.
586, 587 (111.
47. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308 (amended 1973), 9A Part I U.L.A.
cmt. at 447 (1998).
48. S.B. 801, 111. Senate Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem., June 30, 1977, pp. 96 -97
Senate Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem., June 29, 1977, pp. 39(fiche pg. 88); S.B. 801, 111.
42 (fiche pg. 85); S.B. 801, 111. House Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem., June 23, 1977, pp.
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The only asserted justification for the standard of living provision
came soon after the adoption of the UMDA.49 That justification was that
the wide variations in the standard of living of couples coming before the
court precludes the use of any other objective measures in determining
maintenance awards. 50 As the court noted in In re Marriage of Simmons,
variations in standards of living require the court to consider the situation
of each couple before it on a case-by-case basis. 5' The accuracy of this
conclusion is questionable in two key ways. Simmons was decided before
52
the need-threshold was eliminated from the maintenance provisions.
Since that elimination, the importance of determining need of the party
seeking maintenance is greatly lessened. Need is now only a factor to be
considered rather than a threshold to be met before an award of
maintenance is given. It is unclear why the standard of living retains such
significance in determining the situation of a couple. Furthermore,
although the Illinois courts tend to combine the "standard of living" and
"needs of both spouses" provisions,53 the Illinois legislature sought fit to
distinguish these two provisions. This distinction suggests that need and
standard of living are not synonymous.54
The mere fact that the standard of living has been used as a basis for
maintenance awards since 1827, 55 with virtually no examination of the
underpinning rationale, suggests that the provision may be outdated. As
Justice Bradley noted in Bradwell v. Illinois, "the rules of civil society must
be adapted to the general constitution of things . . ,56 The "general
constitution of things" 57 has undoubtedly changed significantly since the
earliest time the standard of living provision was used. This is easily noted
by examining the preceding portion of Justice Bradley's 1872 statement
that "[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the

142-56 (fiche pg. 100); S.B. 801, II1. House Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem., June 15,
1977, pp. 250-53 (fiche pg. 83); S.B. 801, III. Senate Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem., May
19, 1977, pp. 283-87 (fiche pg. 31); S.B. 801, 11. Senate Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem.,
May 17, 1977, pp. 250-53 (fiche pg. 25).
49.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 409 N.E.2d 321 (I11.
App. Ct. 1980).
50.
Id. at 326.
51.
Id.
52.
Act of June 9, 1992, P.A. 87-881, § 504, 1992 Iii. Laws 1019, at 1023-24
(noting that the elimination of the need threshold from Illinois maintenance law became
effective January I, 1993).
53.
Simmons, 409 N.E.2d at 326-27.
54.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(2), (6) (2000).
55.
1833 REV. STAT. OF ILL., pg. 234, § 6.
56.
83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)..
57.
Id.
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noble and benign offices of wife and mother. '58 Undeniably, this view is
no longer widespread in the United States. A rule of law that dates back to
before Justice Bradley made the above statement needs modern
justification. However, as already indicated, a modern justification has not
been given. At a minimum, for the standard of living provision to survive,
a rationale for its existence must be found.
b.

Problems With Its Application

The use of standard of living as a basis upon which to determine
whether to award maintenance disadvantages most women. Few women
are awarded maintenance. 59 Statistics indicate that less than fifteen-percent
of divorced women receive maintenance. 60 The standard of living during
the marriage particularly disadvantages minority 6' and lower-income
women. 62 For example, statistics indicate that the maintenance award rate
for white women is sixteen and two-tenths-percent; for hispanic women it
is eleven and sixth-tenths-percent; and for black women it is ten and seventenths-percent. 63 Of men earning less than $20,000 per year, only fifteenpercent of the men were ordered to pay maintenance. 64 However, of men
earning $30,000 or more per year, sixty-two-percent of the men were
ordered to pay maintenance.65 Based on these figures, it becomes apparent
that the standard of living provision is applied in such a way as to result in
While the standard of living is
income-based disparate impact.
undoubtedly relevant in determining the amount of maintenance to award,
it should not be relevant in determining whether maintenance should be
awarded. If it is, it becomes a threshold test eliminating any award for
women falling below a certain wealth line, resulting in a disparate impact
upon those women.

ld. at 130,141.
See Parkman, supra note 5, at 54 n.15 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Perry, supra note 33, at 2483 n.13 (citations omitted).
WEITZMAN, supra note 32, at 181.
Perry, supra note 33, at 2483 n.13. Perry indicates these statistics are from
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'I OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 1987 8 (1990), and BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 1989 12 (1990).
These statistics are based on Weitzman's
WEITZMAN, supra note 32, at 181.
64.
survey of divorced couples in California in 1978. Id. It is not clear whether Illinois
statistics would be the same or similar, but no other statistics regarding income and divorce
could be ascertained.
65. Id.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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Owing to this threshold test, Illinois' current maintenance law helps
only a select few-middle or upper-income women. In effect, the current
maintenance law divides women into those deserving of support and those
non-deserving of support based on a standard of living largely measured by
a husband's income. 66 Current awards seem to be based on the
paradigmatic marriage in which a woman gives up or temporarily sacrifices
her career for her family. 67 Concern regarding a privileged woman's loss
of status and psychological harm is also present in scholars' examination of
current divorce law trends. 68 This paradigmatic marriage is largely
irrelevant to the lives of lower-income women, and factors such as their
loss of status and psychological harm are never considered. 69
In examining Illinois law, this failure to award lower-income women
maintenance manifests itself in the courts' approach to determining who is
entitled to maintenance.
Illinois courts generally take one of three
approaches to decide if maintenance should be awarded: permanent
awards, rehabilitative awards, and reviewable awards. Where a spouse is
unemployable, is employable at an income below the standard of living
during marriage, or has no real prospect of obtaining employment,
permanent maintenance is appropriate.70 Rehabilitative maintenance is
appropriate if the evidence indicates the spouse will be able to earn an
income that will approximate the standard of living during the marriage. 7
Finally, a court may also reserve jurisdiction to review the award to
determine what efforts the spouse has made toward achieving selfsufficiency.72 As one Illinois scholar, Michael W. Kalcheim, has noted,

66.
67.
68.

Id.
Perry, supra note 33, at 2486-87.
E.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions,

Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT

THE CROSSROADS 191, 202 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
69.
Perry, supra note 33, at 2500.
70.
In re Marriage of Pearson, 603 N.E.2d 720, 728 (II. App. Ct. 1992); "In the
situation where a woman in her 40's marries a wealthy man and their marriage is dissolved
when she is in her 60's, a court may logically conclude that she should continue at the
standard of living of the marriage for the rest of her life, even though she has not been
particularly disadvantaged by the marriage, that is to say, even though there are not
marriage-conditioned needs, and even though there is no marital property." In re Marriage
of Mayhall, 725 N.E.2d 22, 25 (111.
App. Ct. 2000).
71.
See Mayhall, 725 N.E.2d at 25; Pearson, 603 N.E.2d at 728; "[A] trial court
abuses its discretion when it awards rehabilitative maintenance when a spouse is unable to
support herself similarly to the standard of living during the marriage." In re Marriage of
Harlow, 621 N.E.2d 929, 935 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (citation omitted).
72.
Pearson, 603 N.E.2d at 728.
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[t]he terms 'self-supporting' and 'standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage' should always be construed
together.
The homemaker, during the times well in
advance of the separation, was dependent on the wageearning spouse to establish the family standard of living,
which may have included luxuries such as jewelry, furs,
exotic vacations, and dinners at expensive restaurants.7 3
Implied in this statement is the belief that spouses who have not
enjoyed such a high standard of living are unworthy applicants for
maintenance awards. "Self-supporting" in relation to a low standard of
living would not include such luxuries, and it would be much easier for a
woman to obtain such self-support on her income alone. Therefore, under
Kalcheim's rationale, a spouse with a low standard of living during the
marriage has no need for maintenance.
As becomes evident upon examination of Illinois case law, Illinois'
approach to awards of maintenance, vis-i-vis the standard of living
provision, corresponds with Kalcheim's view. Illinois courts allow spouses
with a higher standard of living to obtain maintenance while denying
spouses with a lower standard of living maintenance. Several cases
highlight the weight accorded a couple's standard of living during marriage
in determining whether a spouse is entitled to maintenance. In In re
Marriage of Albrecht,74 Nona and Frank Albrecht had been married for six
years.75 Nona retired early from her job at the Illinois Department of
Public Aid to be with and care for Frank, and consequently lost eight
percent of her pension benefits.76 Frank had also retired from the Illinois
Department of Public Aid but was working as a handy-man. He earned
approximately $300-$500 per month. 7 At the time of the divorce, Nona
was fifty-five and suffered from several health problems.78 The trial court
found that Nona had a monthly income shortfall of $450, while Frank had
enough to cover his monthly expenses.79 Yet, the trial court denied
maintenance, and the appellate court affirmed, noting that "the marriage

73. Michael W. Kalcheim, Illinois Moves Toward Reviewable (Maybe Permanent?)
Maintenance, 81 ILL. B.J. 630, 636 (1993).
App. Ct. 1994).
74. 639 N.E.2d 953 (I11.
75. Id. at 955.
76. Id. at 957.
77. Id. at 956-57.
78. Id. at 956.
79. ld. at 957.
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was of short duration, the marital lifestyle was not
lavish and the petitioner
' 80
is employable, health problems notwithstanding.
In contrast to Albrecht is In re Marriage of Gattone.81 Although the
Albrecht court noted short duration as a factor, Gattone indicates that
duration is essentially trumped by standard of living.8 2 After a marriage of
four years, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of
maintenance in the amount of $1,000 per month for seventy-two months.8 3
Connie Gattone had quit her two part-time jobs at a hospital to move with
Michael Gattone. 84
She was fifty-two years old when the couple
divorced. 85 The appellate court made note of Michael's substantial net
worth. He had an IRA worth $800,000 and a joint stock account worth
$130,000.86
The appellate court also emphasized Connie's health
problems, including depression, asthma,
and prolapsed heart valve, as well
87
as her questionable employability.
Despite the differing results, these two cases are essentially
indistinguishable except for one factor-the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage. Nona was fifty-five when she was divorced, while
Connie was fifty-two. Both women had worked prior to the marriage.
Both women had health problems. However, the court determined that
Nona was not entitled to maintenance despite her monthly shortfall,
because of the short duration of the marriage and because of the fact that
she could work. Conversely, the court determined that Connie was entitled
to maintenance, because of her husband's net worth, her health problems,
and her questionable employment potential. The Gattone court did not
even bother discussing Connie's need or monthly shortfall.88
The results in these cases are completely inapposite for one reason
only-the standard of living during the marriage.89 In one instance, solely
because the standard of living was not lavish, an ex-wife was completely
barred from relief despite her need. In another, an ex-wife was entitled to
relief despite the fact that she may not have even needed that relief. What

80.
Albrecht, 639 N.E.2d at 957.
81.
739 N.E.2d 998 (I11.App. Ct. 2000).
82.
Id. at 1005-07.
83.
Id. at 1005.
84.
Id. at 1001.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Gattone, 739 N.E.2d at 1002, 1005-06.
88.
ld. at 1005-07.
89.
As both cases were decided after the need threshold was removed from the
maintenance provisions, this cannot explain the difference. See Act of June 9, 1992, P.A.
87-881, § 504, 1992 11I.Laws 1019, at 1023-24.

594

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

the Illinois courts fail to realize in formulating this standard of living
threshold is that even a minimal award is beneficial to the spouse receiving
it. For some, a minimal award may mean the difference between being
able to pay rent and buy groceries and not being able to. Accordingly,
while the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage has bearing on the
amount of maintenance to award, the Illinois courts have misapplied this
provision by using it to bar awards to lower-income women. This results in
income-based disparate impact. 90 As the standard of living provision
cannot be applied uniformly because there is no uniform standard of living
among those coming before the courts, the provision must be disregarded
altogether. Any new provisions must strive to find a replacement for the
standard of living measure and take great care to ensure that all income
levels benefit similarly from maintenance provisions.
2.

The Affirmative Obligationto Work Provision

Illinois' maintenance provisions indicate that the courts are to
consider "the present and future earning capacity of each party" and "the
time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire
appropriate education, training, and employment . . ."91 Despite this,
Illinois courts routinely undermine this factor in two contexts-when the

90.
See also Mayhall, 725 N.E.2d 22 (1l1. App Ct. 2000). In Mayhall, a thirty-two
year-old ex-wife was awarded permanent maintenance of $463.67 per month. Id. at 24. She
was, however, found to have an affirmative obligation to find work. Id. at 25-26. The
husband's average gross income was $49,116. Id. at 23. The marriage had lasted fourteen
years. Id. at 23. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's award, noting that even in
short marriages, if a spouse is unemployable at the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage, permanent maintenance is appropriate. Id. at 24. In dissent, Justice Myerscough
stated that the trial court should have awarded rehabilitative maintenance because an award
of permanent maintenance would not serve as an incentive for the wife to achieve financial
independence, even though the award was reviewable. He also noted the fact that she had
approximately thirty to thirty-five years of work ahead of her. Mayhall, 725 N.E.2d at 2627; In re Marriage of Thornton, 412 N.E.2d 1336 (1l. App. Ct. 1980). Elizabeth and
Edmund were married for eleven years before divorcing. Id. at 1344. Elizabeth was forty
when the couple divorced, and had custody of both her twelve year-old and nine year-old
twins. Id. at 1339. The marital property was worth approximately $425,000. Id. Edmund
earned between $127,719 and $145,495 yearly between 1971 and 1977. Id. at 1340.
Elizabeth did not work but had a real estate license. Id. The trial court determined that,
despite the fact she was in good health, she could not work because of the ages of her
children. Thornton, 412 N.E.2d at 1340. The appellate court reversed the trial court's award
of $48,000 per year maintenance and child support, noting it was insufficient in light of the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and remanding to the trial court for
reconsideration. Id. at 1342-45.
91.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(3), (5) (2000).
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spouse seeking maintenance cannot provide for herself at the standard of
living enjoyed during marriage, and when the spouse seeking maintenance
is a displaced homemaker. 92 The courts' treatment of both of these
situations further perpetuates income-based disparate impact in awarding
maintenance. While the courts do not absolutely disregard the affirmative
duty to seek employment, where age and employability indicate that the
spouse cannot sustain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage
courts typically will award the spouse permanent maintenance. 93 As
Illinois courts have noted, the goal of independence must be balanced
against the likelihood that a spouse will be able to support herself at the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 94 Absent the ability to do
so, permanent maintenance is mandated. 95 Although this may not seem
problematic in itself, as scholars and judges note, it may frustrate any
incentive for the spouse receiving permanent maintenance to seek
employment. 96 A spouse receiving permanent maintenance may not be
motivated to actively seek employment, as97Illinois courts are reluctant to
terminate permanent awards on this ground.
Illinois courts also have begun to hold that displaced homemakers do
not necessarily have an affirmative duty to seek employment. 98 For
example, in In re the Marriage of Lukas 99 the court did not impose a duty

92.
See infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
93.
Allen, supra note 42, at 828.
94.
See In re Marriage of Carpel, 597 N.E.2d 847, 863 (ill. App. Ct. 1992); Harlow,
621 N.E.2d at 935; Thornton, 412 N.E.2d at 1343-44. But see Jones, 543 N.E.2d at 134-35
(holding that an ex-wife who had been a homemaker for approximately thirty years had a
duty to seek employment).
95.
See Harlow, 621 N.E.2d at 935; Carpel, 597 N.E.2d at 863; Thornton, 412
N.E.2d at 1343-44.
96.
Miles N. Beerman & Howard A. London, Rehabilitative Maintenance in
Illinois, 75 ILL. B.J. 658, 662-63 (1987); see also supra note 90 (discussing Justice
Myerscough's dissent in Mayhall).
97.
See In re Marriage of Lenkner, 608 N.E.2d 897, 900-03 (l. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that Gail Lenkner had not failed to make good-faith efforts to find employment
during the seven years she had received maintenance); Carpel, 597 N.E.2d at 863-64
(holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in determining that Susan Carpel was
entitled only to rehabilitative maintenance and had failed to meet her affirmative duty to
find employment in the four years she had been receiving maintenance); In re Marriage of
Wade, 511 N.E.2d 156, 165-66 (l. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that Eloise Wade had not failed
to make good-faith efforts to find employment to warrant terminating maintenance). But see
In re Marriage of Ingrassia, 509 N.E.2d 729, 736 (IDl. App. Ct. 1987) and In re Marriage of
Lasota, 465 N.E.2d 649, 652-53 (111. App. Ct. 1984) (both holding that the trial court did
not err in terminating maintenance for wife's failure to seek employment).
98.
But see Jones, 543 N.E.2d at 134-35, discussed supra note 94.
404 N.E.2d 545 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980).
99.
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to affirmatively seek employment upon a woman who had spent twenty1l°
five years as a homemaker, and awarded her permanent maintenance.
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Carpenter,'0 ' the court did not impose an
affirmative duty on a homemaker of a twenty-seven years.102 The court
noted that she was "capable only of part-time work in a supportive
environment" and that "her earning potential and employment
opportunities are severely limited," due to her various emotional
problems. 0 3 As these cases suggest, courts often express concern over the
ability of displaced homemakers to survive after suddenly being thrust into
the working world-a world formerly unknown to them. Similarly, some
scholars take the view that displaced homemakers should not be "placed in
constant financial risk or forced into jobs that are unsuited to their
education and life experience."'0 4 They also note that "[tlo require middle
class women who have devoted their lives to their
families to take menial
' 5
jobs, while their husbands thrive, is inequitable."' 1
On the contrary, other scholars note, "[ilt is unrealistic to suggest that
a divorcing housewife should not be 'forced . . . to play multiple roles
against her will after the marriage ends. ' j 6 While concern over the ability
of a displaced homemaker to earn an adequate living is warranted, concern
that displaced homemakers cannot and should not have to cope with the
reality of the world facing them does little to advance their interests. Such
a concern suggests they are victims and places them in the realm of
dependency that women's advocates have been struggling for so long to
overcome.'0 7 It also perpetuates income-based disparate impact in awards
of maintenance. Most lower-income women are never afforded the choice
of being a homemaker, let alone of remaining a homemaker after
divorce. 0 8 The traditional paradigmatic marriage has little relevance for
lower-income couples, since both spouses may be required to work in order
to support their family.1°9 Why middle- and upper-income women are

100.
Id. at 552-54.
101.
677 N.E.2d 463 (III. App. Ct. 1997).
102.
Id. at 466-67.
103.
Id.
104.
Rhode & Minow, supra note 68, at 202.
105.
Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at 485.
106.
J.Thomas Oldham, Putting Assunder in the 1990s: Divorce Reform at the
Crossroads, 80 CALL. REV. 1091, 1126 (1992) (citations omitted).
107.
See Bartlett, supra note 3, at 482.
108.
See Perry, supra note 33, at 2489-93 (noting that most black women do not
have the option of staying at home or slowing down their careers in order to care for their
families).
109.
Id. at 2493.
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protected from having to work "menial" jobs," ° while lower-income
women are not, can only be explained by income-based disparate impact.
Once again, the courts' application of Illinois maintenance provisions
perpetuates income-based disparate impact by privileging upper-and
middle-income women, while doing nothing to promote or protect the
interests of lower-income women. With these considerations in mind, any
new interpretations or provisions must place a duty to work on all spouses
seeking maintenance, regardless of the standard of living during the
marriage. This will help ensure that all women have access to equal
opportunity for maintenance.
B.

NON-RECIPROCAL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDERED

The Illinois maintenance provisions acknowledge and seek to protect
the value of homemaker services."' As the court noted in In re Marriage
of Aschwanden,"12 affording more weight to the non-financial contributions
of the homemaker achieves this. '13 "The full contribution of a homemaker
includes her 'enabling' function-the opportunities for the family that her
efforts make possible."' " 4 The contributions of a homemaker are often
viewed as a sacrifice, one in which the wife gives up her career for her
family."1 5 While this view is not problematic in itself, courts generally fail
to acknowledge any sacrifices made by husbands. The literature and case
law regarding spousal sacrifice is utterly void of any mention of sacrifices
husbands make in the course of the marriage. A husband may be more
likely to work a large number of hours in order to provide for a family,
especially if his wife is a homemaker. Upon first examination, this may not
seem. like a sacrifice at all-it arguably enables a husband to further his
career opportunities. Yet, what this view fails to take into consideration is
that, while a homemaker is making financial sacrifices in foregoing or
limiting her employment to benefit her family, a husband may be making
personal sacrifices in the relationships with the family he is working to
support.

110.
Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at 485.
Ill.
Barry A. Schatz & Jacalyn Birnbaum, New Statute Promotes Homemakers
Rights, 80 ILL. B.J. 610 (1992).
112.
411 N.E.2d 238 (III. 1980).
113.
Id. at 241.
114.
Schatz & Birnbaum, supra note I I, at 610.
115.
See Carpenter, 677 N.E.2d at 467; In re Marriage of Gunn, 598 N.E.2d 1013,
1019-20 (11. App. Ct. 1992); Perry, supra note 33, at 2486; Schneider, supra note 17.
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While this analogy between a homemaker's and husband's sacrifices
may seem to lack any real similarity, upon closer scrutiny this is not at all
the case.
Scholars note that one of the key characteristics of a
homemaker's sacrifice is that she can never make up lost time in regard to
her future employment potential." 6 Likewise, a husband who works to
support his family may never be able to make up lost time he missed with
his children or repair relationships that have suffered because of that
missed time.
Although there is no suggestion in the maintenance
provisions regarding such a consideration," 7 courts do have the authority to
consider "any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and
equitable."'" 8 This is not to suggest that courts are overvaluing the
sacrifices of homemakers or that working husbands should receive
maintenance for loss in relationships due to working. Rather, this analogy
is simply an example to illustrate that courts fail to consider the sacrifices
of husbands. This failure leads to an unfair result. Accordingly, any new
interpretations or provisions should seek to balance the interests of both
spouses.
C.

THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AFFORDED TO TRIAL COURTS

Illinois courts have a sizeable amount of discretion in determining
whether to award maintenance, how much maintenance to award, and the
duration of any maintenance awarded. 19 Judges and practitioners find little
guidance in the UMDA's provisions regarding maintenance. 20 Even with
Illinois' additional guidelines beyond those of the UMDA, the courts do
not seem to be particularly consistent with regard to when and how much
maintenance to award.' 2' Litigants are unsatisfied with the "judicial
arbitrariness in ordering maintenance or alimony awards."' 22 Since the
parties do not have consistent standards to estimate proper maintenance,

116.
See Ira Mark ElIman, Should the Theory of Alimony Include Nonfinancial
Losses and Motivations?, 1991 BYU L. REV. 259, 272 [hereinafter Ellman, Losses];
Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at 476; Schatz & Birnbaum, supra note I I, at 610.
117.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a) (2000).
118.
5/504(a)(12).
119.
5/504(a); as courts note, a maintenance award is within the trial court's
discretion and will not be reversed unless it is an abuse of discretion or against the manifest
weight of evidence. Harlow, 621 N.E.2d at 933 (citations omitted).
120.
Thurman, supra note 6, at 973, 976.
121.
Rutherford & Tishler, supra note 4, at 477, 479-81, 488.
122.
Thurman, supra note 6, at 971.
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few settlements result. 23 If a settlement is reached, it is likely to be
unfair. 24 Additionally, such discretion arguably increases the bitterness
and emotional strain of divorce. 25 This bitterness and strain is exactly
what the Illinois Legislature had hoped the UMDA would remedy.126 Such
barriers to settlement draw on already limited judicial resources. More
predictability would be beneficial in that it would decrease litigation and
the strain on these limited resources.127 As a final note, when settlement
becomes more difficult, attorneys' fees increase. 28
Attorneys may
become accessible only to the wealthy, 29 again disadvantaging lowerincome women. Accordingly, any new interpretations or provisions must
decrease the amount of discretion the trial court has.
IV.

THE NEED FOR AN ARTICULATION OF NEW MAINTENANCE
STANDARDS

As the above discussion indicates, Illinois' maintenance law faces
several serious problems. Two alternatives exist to correct this problemmodification in application or the development of new standards. The first
alternative is that the courts can begin interpreting and applying the current
maintenance laws provisions to eliminate the income-based disparate
impact problem, the non-reciprocal contributions problem, and the
settlement problem. With the nature of the problems, this seems nearly
impossible. As discussed, courts cannot apply the standard of living
threshold to result in equitable awards of maintenance
because the
30
threshold itself is derived from income-based inequality.
Even if courts do begin to use the standard of living provision not as a
threshold test, but as a measure of how much maintenance to award, the
problem remains-how do courts determine who is awarded maintenance?
Such a determination would depend on the discretion of the trial court and
would be based on the variety of factors provided for in the statute., 31

123.
See id. at 972, 976, 978.
124.
Id.
125.
Id. at 972, 978.
126.
S.B. 801, 111. House Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem., June 23, 1977, p. 150-52
(fiche pg. 100); S.B. 801, 111. House Floor Debates, 80th Gen. Assem., June 15, 1977, p. 252
(fiche pg. 83).
127.
Thurman, supra note 6, at 972, 976.
128.
Id.
129.
Ann Laquer Estin, The Case for Maintenance Reform, 23 COLO. LAW. 53, 53
(1994) [hereinafter Estin, Reform].
130.
See supra notes 59-90 and accompanying text.

131.

750 ILL. COMP.

STAT.

5/504(a) (2000).
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Therefore, the problem of too much judicial discretion would still remain.
Without assigning some sort of value or weight to each factor, there is still
very little guidance for trial courts. These values or weights potentially
could be arbitrary and would be difficult to determine. Courts also have
continuing discretion to consider any other factor they deem just and
equitable. 32 Lastly, the problem of courts affording greater consideration
to one party's interests over another's remains, even if income-based
disparate impact and discretion are curtailed. Thus, it is apparent that reinterpretation or modification of Illinois' maintenance provisions would
likely fail to remedy the problems discussed above. The only other
alternative is to devise a new theory underlying maintenance and formulate
guidelines for an award based on that theory.
V. ALTERNATIVES To ILLINOIS' CURRENT MAINTENANCE LAW
PROVISIONS: CURRENT MAJOR THEORIES AND THEIR PROBLEMS

This comment seeks to give a brief overview of several key theories
analyzing the underlying rationale for maintenance and how it should be
awarded. In doing so, the goal is not to provide a thorough treatment of
each of the theories. Rather, the goal is to highlight their strengths and
weaknesses, which will be considered in synthesizing a new theory.
A.

INCENTIVE THEORY

Ira Mark Ellman's economic incentive theory has received much
attention. 33 Ellman proposes that maintenance awards should prevent
distorting incentives, encourage sharing during the marriage, and properly
allocate losses upon divorce.' 34 Ellman's first principle is that a spouse is
entitled to maintenance only if a post-marital decrease in earning capacity
results from a martial investment.' 3 5 The claimant spouse's economic
situation is compared with the situation had the spouse not married. ,36 Lost
37
earning capacity is the only continuing loss under the above comparison.
The lost opportunity to have married another and non-financial losses are

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(12) (2000).
ElIman, 1osses, supra note 116; Ellman, Theory, supra note 5.
EllIman, Theory, supra note 5, at 50.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
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not compensable. 38 However, an award is not proper in every case in
which a financial loss due to the marriage occurs. According to Ellman,
only financially rational sharing behavior leading to a financial loss
qualifies for compensation. 39 A loss in earning capacity that occurred
because of the accommodation of the other spouse's lifestyle preferences is
not compensable, as it is financially irrational. 40
Nonetheless, a
homemaker spouse is entitled to half the value of her lost earning capacity
when providing care for children, disregarding the rationality of the
behavior. 14'
One of the main criticisms of Ellman's theory is that there is little
indication that such provisions would actually affect the behavior spouses
exhibit within a marriage. 42 The theory's singling out of economic
considerations from the larger context is also problematic. 43 Additionally,
it would be difficult for courts to determine what investments are
financially rational and compensable, and what investments are not
financially rational and not compensable.' 44 The measure of damageslost earning capacity-would be extremely difficult to measure. 45 The
theory is income-based in that it protects only women with a valuable
career to sacrifice." 46 The measure of loss suggests that women should
specialize in domestic matters if they earn less than their husbands. 147 This
suggestion potentially perpetuates the dependency of women. Finally, even
though the principles are phrased as an incentive theory, the damages seem
to be expectation damages. 148
Several considerations should be .taken away from the preceding
examination of the negative aspects of Ellman's theory. Initially, any
theory seeking to actually affect the behavior of those in a marriage should
be undertaken cautiously. The affects on marital behavior are too tenuous
to base a system of maintenance on this goal. Secondly, creating a brightline test for determination of entitlement to awards can be problematic if

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
expectation
dependency

Id. at 56.
Id. at 58.
ElIman, Theory, supra note 5, at 60.
Id. at 71.
Schneider, supra note 17, at 209.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 229-30, 232-33.
Id. at 230; Williams, supra note 33, at 2255-56.
Carbone, Reply, supra note 18, at 1464-65; Schneider, supra note 17, at 219.
Carbone, Reply, supra note 18, at 1472-85. Carbone rejects notions of
damages in the consideration of maintenance awards, since they encourage
and determinations of fault. Id. at 1493, 1474-75.
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that test is based on a factor that is difficult to interpret or apply. The
amount of the award must be relatively easy to determine and apply. Any
new theory should also take care to avoid perpetuating income-based
disparate impact and dependency of women. A determination of whether
maintenance is to contain non-economic losses must also be made, with an
explanation given for that determination.
It
In contrast, Ellman's theory does have positive aspects.
acknowledges that distinctions should be made among marriages with and
without children, and that a pre-determined standard cannot fairly be
applied to all marriages. It recognizes that any awards should relate to a
sacrifice made during the marriage. The theory also acknowledges that it
simply may be too difficult to include non-financial losses in an award. 149
B.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES

The American Law Institute ("AL") began considering the topic of
family dissolution in 1995.150 Since then, it has developed a full scheme for
dealing with maintenance awards upon divorce.' 5' The objective of the
ALl principles is to predictably and equitably allocate financial losses upon
divorce. 52 The principles provide for "compensatory awards" for spouses
in a lengthy marriage who have a lower income or less earning capacity
and experience a loss in their standard of living; for spouses who have a
loss in earning capacity incurred during the marriage and continuing after
the marriage due to that spouse's disproportionate share of child care; and
for spouses who have a loss in earning capacity incurred during the
marriage and continuing after it arising from caring for a third party based
on a moral obligation to do so.153 The total amount of these awards cannot
exceed the maximum award a spouse would receive under section 5.05 if
both spouses have similar incomes. 154 Other compensable losses include a
loss a spouse incurs due to investment in the other spouse's earning

149.

ElIman, Losses, supra note 116, at 282.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, foreward at xiv (Proposed Final Draft, Part 1,Feb. 14, 1997).
151.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, table of contents at xvii-xxvii (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14,
1997).
152.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND

150.

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 5.02 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997).

RECOMMENDATIONS

§§ 5.03, 5.05, 5.06, 5.12 (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997).

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 5.03 (Proposed Final Draft, Part 1, Feb. 14, 1997).

153.

A.L.I.,

154.

A.L.I.,

PRINCIPLES

OF THE LAW OF FAMILY

DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND

PRINCIPLES

OF THE LAW OF FAMILY

DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND
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capacity and the subsequent failure to realize a fair return, as well as an
unfairly disproportionate ability of spouses in a short marriage to recover
their pre-marital standard of living.15 5 These awards are not available to a
spouse who receives a substantial award under sections 5.05, 5.06, or
losses, such as emotional harm, are not
Non-financial
5.12.156
57
compensable.
Notwithstanding the depth of consideration and treatment, the ALl
principles have numerous problems. These include their underlying theory,
their application, and their implications. Although the principles advocate
the single idea of compensation for losses otherwise unaddressed, they fail
to adhere to this in practice. This failure results from the combination of
and masking fault-based awards
notions of contribution and compensation
58
them.
eliminating
rather than
Several of the individual sections suffer from problems as well.
Section 5.05 presumes that joint conduct creates the financial situation that
both parties face upon divorce, justifying wealth reallocation. This notion
is often termed "merger."' 159 While in some marriages this may be
accurate, it is not necessarily true for all marriages. Because of this,
merger does not adequately provide a rationale for all maintenance
awards.' 6° Responsibility may be placed on a spouse in certain situations
even though no connection between the marital conduct and financial
realities of the spouses exist. 6 1 As such, section 5.05 appears to be an
expectation compensation scheme. 62 Compensation in this section is
measured by applying a specific percentage to the difference in incomes.
This percentage is termed a "durational factor," and increases with the
length of marriage until it reaches the maximum award allowed.163 Again,

155.

A.L.I.,

LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND

PRINCIPLES

OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND

PRINCIPLES

OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND

PRINCIPLES OF THE

RECOMMENDATIONS

§§ 5.15, 5.16 (Proposed Final Draft, Part 1,Feb. 14, 1997).

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 5.03 (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997).

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 5.02 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft, Part 1,Feb. 14, 1997).

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 5.05 (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997).

156.

A.L.I.,

157.

A.L.I.,

Carbone, ALI, supra note 18, at 44. Fault-based awards are problematic under
158.
Illinois law because Illinois law provides for both fault-based and no-fault based divorce.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401 (2000).
Alicia Brokars Kelly, Explaining Intuitions: Relating Mergers, Contribution,
159.
and Loss in the ALl Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 185, 193-94 (2001).
Id. at 195-96.
160.
Id. at 193.
161.
Carbone, ALI, supra note 18, at 44, 66.
162.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
163.
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this durational factor may have no relationship to loss suffered.' 64
Differences in income may be due to a variety of factors beyond marital
sacrifice, such as intelligence and effort. 65 Such a provision is also a
"perversion" in that it rewards a person for marrying another with
a high
income. 66 Significant income-based disparate impact in the determination
of who is entitled to an award may result.
Section 5.06 critics argue that a long-term homemaker's lost earning
capacity should only be compensated if the other spouse retains an unjust
benefit from that sacrifice. 167 Measurement of compensation under this
section involves differences in incomes between the spouses. A "child
care durational factor" is applied to the difference in income to determine
the amount of the award. 168 Again, notions of expectation and fault are
present. 169
Some key considerations emerge from the ALl principles and their
criticisms.
Theory and awards implicating principles of expectation
damages and fault should be avoided. The award made should have some
relationship to the loss suffered. The theory and award provisions should
have application to all marriages, not just paradigmatic marriages.
Alternatively, one of the strengths of the ALl principles is that they do
attempt to take into consideration a variety of losses suffered by both
spouses. They also distinguish various types of situations, including long
and short marriages, and marriages with and without children. These
distinctions are helpful because they recognize that all marriages are
*different and warrant different awards.
C.

GENERAL EQUITABLE NOTIONS

A final category of theories includes those based on notions of equity.
These theories assert that maintenance awards are justified because of
equitable concerns and that awards should seek to equitably divide losses
and benefits upon divorce. They generally do not make specific proposals
on how to implement those considerations. Treatment in this comment
simply outlines suggestions and relevant considerations. The theories are
divided as follows: morality, restitution, debt, and equality.
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The moral equitable argument has several components. Carl E.
Schneider, in his critique of Ellman's theory, advances considerations for a
moral theory of maintenance. 7 0 Schneider suggests that any theory must
include choices regarding the kinds of decisions to promote and which
views of marriage society prefers.' 7 ' He asserts that maintenance theory
cannot avoid doing so because of social consequences maintenance has and
protective functions it serves. 172 Another consideration he offers is that a
theory should seek to alleviate the injustices of the current law-namely,
divorce. 173
that women and children bear the burden of financial loss upon
Arguments for restitution-based awards also offer important
June R. Carbone suggests using a restitution-based
considerations.
4 Such a theory would entail making the determination of whether
7
theory.'
the family assumes responsibility for gendered division of labor. 75 If so,
then restitution offers a way to acknowledge the efforts of homemakers
women. 176
without reinforcing the division of labor between men and
Restitution also encourages women to not look to their husbands for
financial security. 77 The goal is that restitution will encourage women to
care for their children and sacrifice to benefit their husbands' careers
because these sacrifices will survive the marriage and be compensable. 178
However, Carbone also acknowledges that the calculation of lost earning
potential will be difficult. 7 9
Another suggestion for the underlying theory and award of
maintenance is that of debts incurred during the marriage. Allen M.
Parkman advances this theory.' 80 Parkman's theory is based on the
reciprocal nature of marriage.' 8' As he notes, spouses often make sacrifices
to benefit the marriage.' 82 These sacrifices should be treated as debts owed
to the sacrificing spouse by the benefiting spouse. 8 3 Parkman suggests that
compensation should be made for the following: loss in limiting a
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85
career, 84 sacrifices to increase the income capacity of the other spouse,1
and loss due to diminished earning capacity in which a spouse sacrificed
his or her best career opportunities.1 86 The couple would share a limitingcareer loss and a diminished-earning capacity loss, meaning that the spouse
receiving compensation is entitled to half of the loss. i87
A final suggestion is that of equality. Jane Rutherford and Barbara
Tishler are among the advocates of this assertion. They note that equality
is the "fairest and simplest way to deal with the unknown gains and losses
of marriage."' 88 According to their theory, any disparate income existing
between the spouses at divorce defines the reasonable needs of the spouse
seeking maintenance. 89 Any disparate income should be divided equally,
which will divide losses incurred in the divorce equally.' 9° Furthermore,
any future increases in the obligor spouse's income should also be
shared. 191

VI. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

A.

CONSIDERATIONS IN FORMULATING NEW MAINTENANCE PROVISIONS

In light of the aforementioned criticisms of current maintenance
theory and potential alternatives, several considerations must be taken into
account in developing and implementing new maintenance law. One of the
first considerations necessary is determining the form any new provisions
should take-general guidelines, strict guidelines, or a formula. General
92
guidelines fail for reasons discussed above regarding judicial discretion.,
Strict guidelines would help alleviate these problems, but also would have
problems of their own. It would be difficult to determine what guidelines
should be relied upon, and how they should be relied upon. Such a
determination may be arbitrary and fail to serve the needs of anyone
involved in a divorce situation.
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Notably, many critics and scholars have advanced the idea of
implementing some type of formula. 193 Ann Lacquer Estin notes that a
formula is most consistent with no-fault divorce.194 Moreover, a properly
determined formula is more likely to benefit all individuals involved in
divorce, regardless of income, as income-based disparate impact would be
eliminated in the formula itself. A formula could easily be developed so
that both parties' interests are taken into consideration. Limits on judicial
a formula, resolving one of the problems of
discretion would exist with
95
current maintenance law.
In devising a formula, the crucial questions are how much income
should be subjected to sharing and for how long. Another important
consideration is any trade-offs that a formula makes. As June Carbone
notes, provisions do not necessarily need doctrinal purity as the cost of
coherence is too high. 196 However, one must consider whether the tradeoffs are appropriate, whether the interests that should receive attention do
receive an appropriate amount of protection, and whether a foundation that
offers a reasonable basis for sound and predictable decisions exists.197 The
trade-off of precision for ease must be worthwhile.' 98
B.

A FORMULA FOR CHANGE

1.

The Formula

The formula I propose to replace the current Illinois maintenance law
is as follows:
1. In marriages in which a child(ren) was born or adopted, and
which is legally the child of the parties, a spouse seeking maintenance:
a. Has an affirmative good-faith obligation to seek permanent
employment. If this affirmative good-faith obligation is not met, the
spouse seeking maintenance is not entitled, to an award. This
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affirmative obligation is excused only in the following situations,
upon sufficient proof:
1. The spouse is retirement age or older;
2. The parties had agreed before divorce proceedings
were initiated that the spouse would remain at home to care for
their young child(ren), or childcare would be a greater expense
than the spouse's employment income would be; or
3. The spouse is in ill-health prohibiting any employment
whatsoever.
b. Is entitled to maintenance as follows:
1. If the spouse sacrificed or is sacrificing his or her
career to remain at home and care for the marital child(ren), and
that spouse's income is lower than the other spouse's, the spouse
is entitled to fifty-percent of the disparity in incomes per year, for
a duration of half of the total number of years spent remaining at
home to care for the marital child(ren), unless (1)(b)(5) applies.
2. If the spouse limited his or her career by working only
part-time to care for the marital child(ren), and that spouse's
income is lower than the other spouse's, the spouse is entitled to
twenty-five percent of the disparity in incomes per year for a
duration of half the total number of years spent limiting his or her
career, unless (1)(b)(5) applies.
3. If the spouse has been the primary caregiver for the
marital child(ren) throughout the marriage and/or has primary
custody of the marital childr(en), and that spouse's income is
lower than the other spouse's, the spouse is entitled to twentyfive percent of the disparity in incomes per year for a duration of
half the total number of years the spouse has been and/or remains
the primary caregiver, unless (1)(b)(5) applies.
4. Maintenance awards under (1)(b)(1), (1)(b)(2), and
(1)(b)(3), are not exclusive of one another, and may be
combined, unless (1)(b)(5) applies.
5. In no event shall the amount of the maintenance award
and child support to be paid to the spouse receiving maintenance
be more than fifty-percent of the obligor spouse's yearly income.
If a maintenance award would require the obligor spouse to pay
more than fifty-percent of his or her yearly income when coupled
with child support, the maintenance award shall be decreased in
order that the obligor spouse is only required to pay fifty-percent
of his or her yearly income. The duration of the award under this
provision will not be affected by this decrease.
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2. In marriages in which no child(ren) was born or adopted, a
spouse seeking maintenance:
a. Has an affirmative good-faith obligation to seek permanent
This obligation is excused only in the following
employment.
situations, upon sufficient proof to the trial court:
1. The spouse is retirement age or older; or
2. The spouse is in ill-health, prohibiting any
employment whatsoever.
b. Is entitled to maintenance as follows:
1. If the spouse sacrificed his or her career to remain at
home and care for the home, and that spouse's income is lower
than the other spouse's, the spouse is entitled to twenty-five
percent of the disparity in incomes per year for a duration of half
of the total number of years spent caring for the home.
If the spouse has not limited or sacrificed his or her career,
c.
the spouse is not entitled to maintenance.
3. In marriage in which one spouse has financially contributed to
the education or training of the other spouse, the contributing spouse is
entitled to receive the entire amount of contributions made to the other
spouse's direct educational expenses to be paid in an amount and over a
period of time the court determines appropriate, provided the contribution
was made within ten years of the divorce. This provision does not limit the
award available under either (1) or (2), and is an additional basis for award.
However, (1)(b)(5) applies to this provision.
4. Any award provided for under (1), (2), or (3) does not cease upon
the cohabitation or remarriage of the spouse receiving the award.
5. Any award may be provided for under (1), (2), or (3) may be
awarded before final dissolution of the marriage, but is subject to
modification upon the final findings of order of dissolution.
6. Any award is reviewable and modifiable upon sufficient proof
that the award was based on erroneous facts or circumstances, or that a
change in circumstances warranting a change in the amount of the original
award has occurred.
2.

Underlying Principles

This formula attempts to accomplish several things while balancing all
the interests discussed throughout this comment in the best manner
possible. Primarily, it attempts to alleviate the problems from which the
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current Illinois maintenance provisions suffer. 199 Namely, the formula
seeks to protect the interests of lower-income women by providing for
awards that envision their circumstances, as well as the circumstances of
middle- and upper-income women. It attempts to anticipate all the
circumstances of the parties seeking maintenance. It is "adapted to the
general,2 °°constitution of things," and is not "based upon exceptional
cases.
The formula also seeks to prevent income-based disparate impact
through imposing an affirmative requirement on all spouses to seek
employment; unless they fall within one of the listed exceptions. A
middle- or upper-income woman cannot avoid a duty of employment
simply because she has never worked before or because her employment
will not allow her to live at the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage. This provision is also flexible in that it is a good-faith
requirement, not an absolute requirement. This allows a spouse seeking
maintenance to obtain it if she cannot find employment. Lower-income
versus middle- and upper-income women will generally have smaller
maintenance awards, due to presumably greater disparities in income
between husbands and wives in middle- and upper-income marriages.
Lower-income women are entitled to benefits if they sacrificed similar
interests as middle and upper-income women within their marriage.
Lower-income women are equally as deserving of an award, despite their
lower standard of living.
In addition, the formula attempts to balance the interests of each party
through the trade-offs it makes. The formula is an attempt at a modified
restitution post-divorce income-sharing plan. It is modified because full
income sharing fails to properly take into consideration the interests of both
spouses.20 '
Full income sharing, while premised upon notions of
restitution, seems in application to be expectation damages. It entitles
the spouse seeking maintenance to an approximation of what he or she
would have had if the marriage had continued. 0 3 This formula seeks to
account for sacrifices each party makes and to apportion those losses
equally on both parties. Neither party must bear the entire burden of any
marital sacrifice. Spouses seeking maintenance are required to work so
that the entire burden of their support does not fall on the supporting
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spouse. Marriages with and without children are distinguished, as very
different sacrifices are presumably involved in each situation. 204 Such a
distinction is also made between fully sacrificing and limiting a career, or
acting as the primary caregiver, to protect the interests of both the
sacrificing spouse and the supporting spouse.
If no sacrifice for the marriage is made, no maintenance is allowable.
This is the only logical conclusion because nothing exists to compensate.
A supporting spouse is never obligated to pay more than fifty-percent of his
or her income for child support and maintenance. This is designed to
protect his or her ability to maintain a home and help support a new family,
if such are the circumstances.
The interests of the spouse seeking
maintenance are further protected because sacrifices are fully compensated
for, regardless of cohabitation or remarriage. This is so because the award
is restitution-based in theory. Cohabitation and remarriage do not alter the
fact that a spouse made a sacrifice. Finally, any financial contribution
toward the direct educational expenses of the other spouse is fully
compensable, if the contribution occurred within ten years of the divorce.
The provisions are structured in such a manner to protect the interest of
both spouses. If the contribution was made recently, presumably the
spouse making it has not had an opportunity to fully recognize the value of
the contribution.
As more time elapses since the contribution, the
contributing spouse arguably will have an increased return on the
investment in the form of an increased standard of living due to the
increased employment potential of the other spouse.
The formula also attempts to eliminate judicial discretion in devising
specific guidelines that generally must be followed. Indeed, the only areas
in which a trial court has discretion are determining whether a spouse falls
within an exception to the obligation to work or has made a good-faith
effort to seek employment, in determining how to structure repayment for
contributions for educational expenses, in determining whether to award
maintenance pre-dissolution, and in determining whether the award was
erroneous or ought to be modified. Although this is a drastic shift from the
current law, such a formula is arguably the only way in which to achieve
consistency.
Finally, this formula seeks ease in application. To accomplish this,
the formula sacrifices absolute accuracy. It sacrifices non-financial losses
in favor of strictly financial losses. Non-financial losses, such as the
opportunity cost of foregoing marriage to another 20 5 and emotional losses 20 6
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are not included because they would be enormously difficult to quantify.
They would also likely be prohibitive because of the sheer number of nonfinancial losses incurred during a marriage. Any true restitution award,
such as pure career damage suffered due to homemaking or career limiting,
is foregone because of its extreme difficulty in application.2 0 7 It would
simply be too difficult to determine a spouse's career path for someone
who has never worked or has been out of the workplace for an extended
period. Hence, the modified post-divorce income sharing attempts to
balance the need to compensate for losses in a manner that is workable with
the need to rationally relate compensation to losses incurred. Both spouses
share any loss that is incurred, as neither should be fully burdened for a
marital decision. Consequently, any loss is divided in two, with half the
loss being apportioned to each spouse, both financially and durationally.
After this determination, the formula attempts to assign a value to the
sacrifice made.
3.

PotentialAdvantages

One of the key advantages the proposed formula would offer is the
elimination of income-based disparate impact in the awarding of
maintenance. The couple's standard of living has nothing to do with a
determination of whether maintenance is awarded. The formula attempts to
provide its benefits for all spouses seeking maintenance, regardless of their
economic positions before marriage. Similarly, the affirmative requirement
to work would help prevent perpetuation of income-based stereotypes and
dependency norms. The formula also considers the needs of both parties
by attempting to prevent an unfair burden on either party. It seeks to
provide compensation for sacrifices that have had a detrimental economic
impact on the party making them.
Another of the benefits this formula would offer is its decreased
amount of discretion afforded trial courts. Limiting judicial discretion
would hopefully lead to an increase in the amount and fairness of
settlements, and a concomitant ease in administration by expending fewer
Such consistent results would also help decrease
judicial resources.
settlement more efficient. Bitterness and
by
making
fees
attorneys'
decline because factual determinations are
also
probably
hostility would
very few, and those that are necessary are much easier to determine than
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under Illinois' current law. As a final point, if the formula proves to be
problematic, adjustments can easily be made to the amount and/or duration
of maintenance provided for. Other situations not envisioned and provided
for could also easily be included within its coverage.
4.

Potential Criticismsand Replies to Them

Despite the potential advantages to this formula, it is not without its
drawbacks. While it is desirable to reduce judicial discretion, the resulting
effect of that decrease is a rather rigid set of guidelines for determining
who is entitled to maintenance and how much they are entitled to. This
rigidity may result in less appropriate awards in some cases. Moreover, the
values assigned to each sacrifice may not be correct approximations.
Nonetheless, a few improper awards are outweighed by a system that
results in mostly proper awards being given. The larger benefit outweighs
the smaller harm done. Another potential criticism is that since the formula
precludes case-by-case determinations, it may not accurately take into
account all marital sacrifices and contributions. The logical response to
this is that no system of maintenance will ever be able to fully determine
and appropriate award damages for all sacrifices and contributions made
during the marriage. Additionally, divorce is not the mechanism that will
equalize all inequalities that flow from a marriage. Indeed, some may
never be equalized. It may be difficult to administer in the sense that an
obligor spouse's income may vary from year to year, resulting in returns to
court on a regular basis. Given the ease of determining whether a change
in maintenance is warranted and how much change is warranted, the
likelihood of yearly return visits to the court is balanced and its impact
minimized.
CONCLUSION
Maintenance law has been a source of much inconsistency among trial
courts, unhappiness among litigants, and conflict among critics. An
examination of the Illinois courts' application of the provisions helps
clarify what some of the major problems are with Illinois' maintenance
provisions. Most importantly, the inconsistent application of the standard
of living and affirmative obligation to work provisions results in incomebased disparate impact. Lower-income women's interests are largely
unprotected and unrecognized, while middle- and upper-income women are
sheltered from the world they currently face. What is more, the courts'
application of the provisions does not equally recognize and afford
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protection for husbands' interests. As a result, wives' sacrifices are
overemphasized and husbands' sacrifices are not emphasized at all. The
significant judicial discretion afforded trial courts is part of the reason for
This discretion and its concomitant
the above-noted problems.
inconsistency leads to difficulty in settling and in settling fairly. Attorneys
cannot correctly approximate what a trial court will do in regards to
awarding maintenance. With these major problems and the extreme
difficulty of amending the current provisions to correct these problems,
new provisions are needed.
In examining the diverse criticisms of maintenance law in general,
upon first glance, it seems that many of the ideas for theory and
implementation are genuinely incompatible. Upon deeper analysis, though,
this is not the case. All the theories outlined in this comment advance one
common theme-a theory and application that protects as many interests as
possible as fairly and consistently as possible. With this underlying basis,
this comment has attempted to synthesize some of the major theories,
applications, and considerations, and develop a new proposal for
maintenance in Illinois. This new proposal-a formula-seeks to correct
the current problems facing Illinois maintenance law in a manner that
advances as many of the interests of both parties as possible, while also
attempting to make the resulting theory and formula as fair and workable as
possible. While the new formula has drawbacks, it also has benefits.
Hopefully, this formula will be the beginning of ushering in the new and
ushering out the old, so that maintenance law may better serve those it is
designed to help.
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